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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANITA DUMESNIL CUMMINGS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
PATRICK C. CUMMINGS, 
De fendant-Appe1Iant. 
Case No, 14611 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent takes no issue with the lengthy recitals 
explaining the nature of the case. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant states that he 
"* * * seeks reversal of the lower court's order 
and judgment with respect to the issue of alimony." 
The precise result sought is not stated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent takes considerable offense from this state-
ment at page 4 of appellant's brief: 
"Since the Decree of Divorce, each party has 
established a separate life, both entering 
into a long-term relationship with a member 
of the opposite sex * * *." 
There is no evidence to support that statement and no truth in 
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the insinuation. Counsel asks the respondent: 
11Q. Do you have a boy friend now? 
"THE COURT: I don't think that is material." 
(R. 151) 
and there is absolutely no other testimony on that subject. 
Respondent requests the Court to delete that statement from 
appellant's brief and to ignore it. 
At the top of page 5, appellant makes the statement 
that respondent 
"* * * was unemployed for a substantial period 
of time, but has now taken part-time employment." 
That statement is misleading, because in the trial of the 
action, the Court found that respondent at that time had part-
time employment. (R. 26, Finding 12) 
The next sentence in appellant's brief on page 5 is 
simply a speculation about what has caused bad feelings between 
the parties and that the children keep them irritated. Such 
speculation has no part in a statement of facts. 
Likewise as to the next paragraph on page 5 in the 
statement of facts, any speculation as to what the Court 
attempted to do by its Judgment and Decree is not properly 
a part of the statement of facts. 
FURTHER STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The financial facts in evidence are as follows: 
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Appellant testified that his income in 19 73 was $1,700 per 
month (R. 121); in 1974 it was around $20,000 (R. 122); and 
in 1975 his gross was $16,047 (R. 123); and in 1976 it is 
$775 per month from the vending machine business, plus $470 
per month payments on the sale of June's Restaurant (R. 125 
and 127) and $5,855 remaining from the down payment of $25,000 
after he had paid off his obligations (R. 126). 
Appellant further testified that at the time of the 
divorce, he was operating the Crossroads Restaurant in Tremonton 
and the Hub Restaurant in Salt Lake (R. 121) and he lost his 
lease at the Crossroads (R. 123) and gave up the Hub Restaurant 
(R. 123). He purchased a $115,000 home and ranch in Salt Lake 
County with $20,000+ down (R. 136); sold that home and purchased 
another (R. 137 and 143), on which the monthly payments are 
$320 per month (R. 145). He bought June's Restaurant in Midvale 
in 1975 (R. 123) and sold it in 1976 for $180,000, of which he 
owed $117,000 (R. 124 and 125), thereby losing its income of 
$500 per month (R. 124). Appellant has now gone into the 
vending machine business (R. 125); he purchased a new Blazer 
for $2,600 plus his pickup truck (R. 140), and has put a new 
motor in his boat at a cost of $1,155 (R. 140), and is con-
templating building a place in Heber Valley (R. 137). 
Respondent testified that she had monthly expenses at 
the present time of $906.70 (R. 148) and that at the time of 
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the divorce they were approximately $873 (R. 148). She is 
now working part time to pay her bills and had been earning 
$200 a month (R. 148), which was at the time of the hearing 
a gross of $250 (R. 151). She has borrowed money from her 
parents to make a down payment on a car (R. 152) and the 
total she owes them is more than $1,000 (R. 155). Her three 
boys need clothes, dental care, one needs glasses and they 
want to take classes in athletics, none of which she can 
afford for lack of money (R. 154). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant sets out in five numbers some of the things 
the decision of Judge Croft covered. Appellant omits reference 
to the only Finding relevant to what appellant claims is his 
basis for appeal, namely: 
"3. Defendant's income has been temporarily 
reduced with apparent good earning ability in 
the defendant. His current income from vending 
machines, games, and Southland Corporation is 
$775 per month, with a down payment on sale of 
June's Restaurant expected in the total amount 
of $25,000 and $470 per month with eight and 
one-half percent (8-1/2%) interest. Expenses 
of sale and obligations will leave defendant 
approximately $5,000 from the down payment." 
(R. 80) 
The reasoning of the Court which led to inclusion 
of Finding of Fact No. 3 is found in statements of the Court 
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made at the conclusion of the arguments, where the Court 
summarized appellant's income as indicated for 1976 and con-
cluded: 
11
 * * * so that puts it, you see, back up, 
money available for him this year $20,000." 
(R. 156) 
and then reviewed the expenditures of appellant, as well as 
money available to him with which he could pay alimony, with 
the concluding comment: 
"I just don't view it as being something 
that this Court should ignore." (R. 157) 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
1. Do appellant's changed circumstances compel 
relief? 
2• May the Court consider the temporary nature of 
the change in circumstances? 
3. Did the trial court exceed its discretion? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DO APPELLANT'S CHANGED 
CIRCUMSTANCES COMPEL RELIEF? 
Respondent concedes that the appellant's circumstances 
have changed. Appellant formerly was in the restaurant busi-
ness and is now in the vending machine business. At the time 
of the divorce, appellant lived in a motor home and has since 
purchased two homes successively and is contemplating building 
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a third. 
Appellants income has fluctuated from a salary of 
$20,400 in 1973 to in excess of $20,000 from the restaurant 
business in 1974 down to $16,047 in 1975 and for the year 
1976 at the rate indicated from the testimony of appellant, 
he will have income of $775 per month from the vending 
machine business, $470 per month payments on his restaurant 
sale, a balance of cash of $5,855 from the down payment of 
$25,000, all of which will total $20,795. 
Appellant is not suffering from lack of funds, as 
evidenced by his purchase of a new Blazer, his putting a new 
motor in his boat, his purchase of June's Restaurant in 
Midvale, his sale of June's Restaurant in Midvale with an 
equity of $63,000, and his continuing to own his motor home, 
his boat, his three motorcycles (R. 140), his $2,000 stereo, 
and his 4,000 shares of Heber Creeper stock, which may have 
no value (R. 142). 
Respondent's circumstances have changed but little. 
Her expenses have gone up slightly (R. 148); she has had to 
borrow money from her parents to replace a worn-out automobile 
and for other purposes (R. 152, 155) and has been compelled 
to work part time to meet her obligations (R. 148) and still 
is unable to give her boys things which they reasonably are 
in need of (R. 154). 
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The Court, in commenting on the facts, noted that 
appellant's income for 1976 will be $20,000, including the 
net down payment on the sale of the restaurant and the monthly 
payments from the restaurant (R. 156) . This compares favorably 
with the $20,400 which appellant made in 1973 at the rate of 
$1,700 per month (R. 121). 
The Court properly considered that appellant's available 
income included the net down payment on his sale of the res-
taurant and the monthly payments from the restaurant contract. 
The monthly payments just about take the place of the income 
from the restaurant, which was $500 per month, and appellant 
simply elected to get out of the restaurant business and into 
the vending machine business, which was a choice he controlled. 
Appellant cites no authority which supports his position. 
Appellant cites Short v. Short, 25 Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54, at 
page 14 of his Brief. In that case, the wife had been employed 
before the divorce and found employment again after the divorce. 
Those facts alone did not call for modification of the Decree. 
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 20 Utah 2d 360, 438 P.2d 180, 
this Court considered all sorts of factors, including income 
from investments by the wife, increase in value of investments 
and new activities by the husband, all of which were considered 
and were held by this Court not to constitute a sufficient 
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change in circumstance and the District Court was required 
to reverse its order of modification. 
A reduction in income from $41,000 to $30,000 per 
year was held not sufficient to require reduction of alimony 
over denial by the District Court in McRoberts v. McRoberts, 
80 Idaho 511, 335 P.2d 342. Likewise, in Edwards v. Edwards, 
82 Nev. 392, 419 P.2d 637, where income had dropped from 
$27,000 to $17,000 per year and the defendant was maintaining 
two excess cars, the expense of which was equal to the amount 
of reduction he sought, the denial of modification was held 
proper. 
POINT II 
MAY THE COURT CONSIDER THE TEMPORARY 
NATURE OF THE CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES? 
Appellant had just gotten out of the restaurant busi-
ness in March, 1976 (R. 123-124). He was, therefore, just 
getting started in the vending machine business and doesn't 
expect to stay at earnings of only $775 a month from that 
business. When asked: 
"So you are going to have to try a little 
harder and earn a little more, aren't you?" 
Appellant answered: 
"You bet." (R. 140) 
This Court has held that compensation must be 
permanent to constitute grounds to modify a provision for 
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alimony. Carson v, Carson, 87 Utah 1, 47 P.2d 894 (1935). 
Also, that potential earnings must be considered where a 
person seeking to have a decree modified in his favor is 
working at less than his potential. Osmus v. Osmus, 114 
Utah 216, 198 P.2d 233 (1948); Lambert v. Lambert, 66 Wash.2d 
503, 403 P.2d 664 (1965) . In Lambert, the defendant lost 
his reputation and, therefore, his business over the matters 
involved in the divorce and took a salary job in a nearby 
town, which he lost because he was moonlighting against his 
employer. Modification was refused. 
In Low v. Low, 79 Colo. 408, 246 P. 266, the Colorado 
Supreme Court set aside a reduction of alimony based upon the 
wife's obtaining a teaching job because she was on probation. 
In Commonwealth ex rel Saul v. Saul, 175 Pa.Super. 
540, 107 A.2d 182, the husband had obtained a decree reducing 
alimony from $90 to $75 per week based upon his reduction in 
salary and his heart attack. The Superior Court reversed for 
the reason that the heart attack was not shown to impair earning 
power permanently and the reduction in his earnings was a 
matter he had arranged. 
POINT III 
DID THE TRIAL COURT EXCEED ITS DISCRETION? 
Respondent submits that the testimony clearly supports 
the decision of the trial Judge. The appellant voluntarily 
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changed his occupation, was just getting started in a new 
business, has ample total income to make the payments in 
1976 and in the foreseeable future, is living very well 
himself and denying himself nothing, and has simply tried to 
take advantage of his temporary reduction in monthly income 
to escape his responsibilities. The respondent is patently 
short of funds, had obtained temporary work before the trial 
on its merits; and at the time of the hearing and while the 
boys were in school was doing part-time work to meet her 
ordinary and reasonable expenses. 
The party seeking the modification has the burden 
of proof. Sorensen v. Sorensen, supra» The trial court has 
the same discretion in a trial for modification of a decree 
as in the original action. Mitchel v. Mitchel, 527 P.2d 1359 
(Utah 1974), And this Court has held in Hansen v. Hansen, 
537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1974), that this Court will affirm unless 
there is a clear abuse of discretion: 
"In a divorce action, the trial court has 
considerable latitude of discretion in 
adjusting financial and property interests. 
The burden is upon the appellant to prove 
that there was a misunderstanding or mis-
application of the law resulting in sub-
stantial and prejudicial error; or that the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings as made; or a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of dis-
cretion ." 
The court's decision in the matter now before the Court 
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was announced in open court: 
"I think Mr. Cummings1 reduction in income is 
a temporary thing and I am not impressed that 
there is such a substantial change in circumstances 
here as to justify modification of the support 
and alimony payments. I do think Mrs. Cummings 
ought to get herself a better job. She ought 
to get remarried and enjoy the rest of her life 
and bring a man into the house that can help 
her take care of three boys she has got to 
raise." (R. 159) 
The court's decision was fairly reflected in the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, especially Finding 
of Fact No. 3. 
CONCLUSION 
On the record before the Court, there is ample 
evidence to support the denial of modification by the District 
Court. The drop in income of the appellant is temporary and 
even if it should be permanent, under the authorities cited, 
the order is well within the discretion of the trial Judge. 
The trial Judge gave careful consideration to the problems of 
the parties, made some appropriate modifications of the Decree 
and its Judgment, Order and Modification of Decree (R. 111-112) 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
By Afg^uxJ^ , AJ^JS ^ ., 
RICHARD L. BIRD, JK7" 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
